The Gallery Collection/Corbis The Tower of Babel' by Pieter Brueghel the Elder, 1563.
Do
the languages we speak shape the way we think? Do they merely express
thoughts, or do the structures in languages (without our knowledge or
consent) shape the very thoughts we wish to express?
Take "Humpty
Dumpty sat on a..." Even this snippet of a nursery rhyme reveals how
much languages can differ from one another. In English, we have to mark
the verb for tense; in this case, we say "sat" rather than "sit." In
Indonesian you need not (in fact, you can't) change the verb to mark
tense.
In
Russian, you would have to mark tense and also gender, changing the
verb if Mrs. Dumpty did the sitting. You would also have to decide if
the sitting event was completed or not. If our ovoid hero sat on the
wall for the entire time he was meant to, it would be a different form
of the verb than if, say, he had a great fall.
In Turkish, you
would have to include in the verb how you acquired this information.
For example, if you saw the chubby fellow on the wall with your own
eyes, you'd use one form of the verb, but if you had simply read or
heard about it, you'd use a different form.
Do English,
Indonesian, Russian and Turkish speakers end up attending to,
understanding, and remembering their experiences differently simply
because they speak different languages?
These questions touch
on all the major controversies in the study of mind, with important
implications for politics, law and religion. Yet very little empirical
work had been done on these questions until recently. The idea that
language might shape thought was for a long time considered untestable
at best and more often simply crazy and wrong. Now, a flurry of new
cognitive science research is showing that in fact, language does
profoundly influence how we see the world.
The
question of whether languages shape the way we think goes back
centuries; Charlemagne proclaimed that "to have a second language is to
have a second soul." But the idea went out of favor with scientists
when Noam Chomsky's theories of language gained popularity in the 1960s
and '70s. Dr. Chomsky proposed that there is a universal grammar for
all human languages—essentially, that languages don't really differ
from one another in significant ways. And because languages didn't
differ from one another, the theory went, it made no sense to ask
whether linguistic differences led to differences in thinking.
Use Your Words
Some findings on how language can affect thinking.
- Russian speakers, who have more words for light and dark blues, are better able to visually discriminate shades of blue.
- Some
indigenous tribes say north, south, east and west, rather than left and
right, and as a consequence have great spatial orientation.
- The
Piraha, whose language eschews number words in favor of terms like few
and many, are not able to keep track of exact quantities.
- In
one study, Spanish and Japanese speakers couldn't remember the agents
of accidental events as adeptly as English speakers could. Why? In
Spanish and Japanese, the agent of causality is dropped: "The vase
broke itself," rather than "John broke the vase."
The
search for linguistic universals yielded interesting data on languages,
but after decades of work, not a single proposed universal has
withstood scrutiny. Instead, as linguists probed deeper into the
world's languages (7,000 or so, only a fraction of them analyzed),
innumerable unpredictable differences emerged.
Of course, just
because people talk differently doesn't necessarily mean they think
differently. In the past decade, cognitive scientists have begun to
measure not just how people talk, but also how they think, asking
whether our understanding of even such fundamental domains of
experience as space, time and causality could be constructed by
language.
For example, in Pormpuraaw, a remote Aboriginal
community in Australia, the indigenous languages don't use terms like
"left" and "right." Instead, everything is talked about in terms of
absolute cardinal directions (north, south, east, west), which means
you say things like, "There's an ant on your southwest leg." To say
hello in Pormpuraaw, one asks, "Where are you going?", and an
appropriate response might be, "A long way to the south-southwest. How
about you?" If you don't know which way is which, you literally can't
get past hello.
About a third of the world's languages (spoken
in all kinds of physical environments) rely on absolute directions for
space. As a result of this constant linguistic training, speakers of
such languages are remarkably good at staying oriented and keeping
track of where they are, even in unfamiliar landscapes. They perform
navigational feats scientists once thought were beyond human
capabilities. This is a big difference, a fundamentally different way
of conceptualizing space, trained by language.
Differences in how
people think about space don't end there. People rely on their spatial
knowledge to build many other more complex or abstract representations
including time, number, musical pitch, kinship relations, morality and
emotions. So if Pormpuraawans think differently about space, do they
also think differently about other things, like time?
To find
out, my colleague Alice Gaby and I traveled to Australia and gave
Pormpuraawans sets of pictures that showed temporal progressions (for
example, pictures of a man at different ages, or a crocodile growing,
or a banana being eaten). Their job was to arrange the shuffled photos
on the ground to show the correct temporal order. We tested each person
in two separate sittings, each time facing in a different cardinal
direction. When asked to do this, English speakers arrange time from
left to right. Hebrew speakers do it from right to left (because Hebrew
is written from right to left).
Pormpuraawans,
we found, arranged time from east to west. That is, seated facing
south, time went left to right. When facing north, right to left. When
facing east, toward the body, and so on. Of course, we never told any
of our participants which direction they faced. The Pormpuraawans not
only knew that already, but they also spontaneously used this spatial
orientation to construct their representations of time. And many other
ways to organize time exist in the world's languages. In Mandarin, the
future can be below and the past above. In Aymara, spoken in South
America, the future is behind and the past in front.
In
addition to space and time, languages also shape how we understand
causality. For example, English likes to describe events in terms of
agents doing things. English speakers tend to say things like "John
broke the vase" even for accidents. Speakers of Spanish or Japanese
would be more likely to say "the vase broke itself." Such differences
between languages have profound consequences for how their speakers
understand events, construct notions of causality and agency, what they
remember as eyewitnesses and how much they blame and punish others.
In
studies conducted by Caitlin Fausey at Stanford, speakers of English,
Spanish and Japanese watched videos of two people popping balloons,
breaking eggs and spilling drinks either intentionally or accidentally.
Later everyone got a surprise memory test: For each event, can you
remember who did it? She discovered a striking cross-linguistic
difference in eyewitness memory. Spanish and Japanese speakers did not
remember the agents of accidental events as well as did English
speakers. Mind you, they remembered the agents of intentional events
(for which their language would mention the agent) just fine. But for
accidental events, when one wouldn't normally mention the agent in
Spanish or Japanese, they didn't encode or remember the agent as well.
In
another study, English speakers watched the video of Janet Jackson's
infamous "wardrobe malfunction" (a wonderful nonagentive coinage
introduced into the English language by Justin Timberlake), accompanied
by one of two written reports. The reports were identical except in the
last sentence where one used the agentive phrase "ripped the costume"
while the other said "the costume ripped." Even though everyone watched
the same video and witnessed the ripping with their own eyes, language
mattered. Not only did people who read "ripped the costume" blame
Justin Timberlake more, they also levied a whopping 53% more in fines.
Beyond
space, time and causality, patterns in language have been shown to
shape many other domains of thought. Russian speakers, who make an
extra distinction between light and dark blues in their language, are
better able to visually discriminate shades of blue. The Piraha, a
tribe in the Amazon in Brazil, whose language eschews number words in
favor of terms like few and many, are not able to keep track of exact
quantities. And Shakespeare, it turns out, was wrong about roses: Roses
by many other names (as told to blindfolded subjects) do not smell as
sweet.
Patterns in language offer
a window on a culture's dispositions and priorities. For example,
English sentence structures focus on agents, and in our
criminal-justice system, justice has been done when we've found the
transgressor and punished him or her accordingly (rather than finding
the victims and restituting appropriately, an alternative approach to
justice). So does the language shape cultural values, or does the
influence go the other way, or both?
Languages, of course, are
human creations, tools we invent and hone to suit our needs. Simply
showing that speakers of different languages think differently doesn't
tell us whether it's language that shapes thought or the other way
around. To demonstrate the causal role of language, what's needed are
studies that directly manipulate language and look for effects in
cognition.
One
of the key advances in recent years has been the demonstration of
precisely this causal link. It turns out that if you change how people
talk, that changes how they think. If people learn another language,
they inadvertently also learn a new way of looking at the world. When
bilingual people switch from one language to another, they start
thinking differently, too. And if you take away people's ability to use
language in what should be a simple nonlinguistic task, their
performance can change dramatically, sometimes making them look no
smarter than rats or infants. (For example, in recent studies, MIT
students were shown dots on a screen and asked to say how many there
were. If they were allowed to count normally, they did great. If they
simultaneously did a nonlinguistic task—like banging out rhythms—they
still did great. But if they did a verbal task when shown the dots—like
repeating the words spoken in a news report—their counting fell apart.
In other words, they needed their language skills to count.)
All
this new research shows us that the languages we speak not only reflect
or express our thoughts, but also shape the very thoughts we wish to
express. The structures that exist in our languages profoundly shape
how we construct reality, and help make us as smart and sophisticated
as we are.
Language is a uniquely human gift. When we study
language, we are uncovering in part what makes us human, getting a peek
at the very nature of human nature. As we uncover how languages and
their speakers differ from one another, we discover that human natures
too can differ dramatically, depending on the languages we speak. The
next steps are to understand the mechanisms through which languages
help us construct the incredibly complex knowledge systems we have.
Understanding how knowledge is built will allow us to create ideas that
go beyond the currently thinkable. This research cuts right to the
fundamental questions we all ask about ourselves. How do we come to be
the way we are? Why do we think the way we do? An important part of the
answer, it turns out, is in the languages we speak.
—Lera Boroditsky is a professor of psychology at Stanford University and editor in chief of Frontiers in Cultural Psychology.
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